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Abstract 
The ‘Green Economy’ is fast becoming the new alpha and omega to solve both the environmental and 
economic crisis at the same time. Policy makers, corporations, political actors, and NGO’s are 
increasingly uniting behind the slogan of the Green Economy. Or would it be better to speak about 
‘green capitalism’? Going green is not only important in the fight against environmental destruction, it 
also makes a country “stronger, healthier, safer, more innovative, competitive and respected”, argues 
Thomas Friedman, the well-known New York Times columnist. “Is there anything that is more patriotic, 
capitalist and geostrategic than this?” Indeed, the rationale underlying the project of the Green 
Economy is that if the market could become the instrument for tackling the environmental crisis, the 
fight against this crisis could be the royal road to solving the problems of the market. While the 
discourse on the Green Economy claims to reconcile in one single project the struggle against the 
environmental crisis and the attempt to solve the economic crisis, these two elements are not standing 
on the same footing: greening the economy is for a big part considered as a means for the specific end 
of saving the market. Focusing in particular on the Green Economy’s impact on climate change, this 
paper analyses the Green Economy as a hegemonic project that tries to retranslate environmental 
concerns into a new jargon, and to turn environmental antagonism into a new motor for capital 
accumulation. 
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Introduction 
 
“I believe that the transition to a green economy is good for our economy and good for all of us, and I 
have invested in it”, Al Gore famously stated in a discussion with a member of the US Congress in 2009. 
Especially in environmentally conscious circles within international institutions, global lobby firms and 
thinktanks, the ‘Green Economy’ has rapidly become the new big thing. During the last years, we 
witnessed a proliferation of initiatives in this field, including Green Economy magazines, a Green 
Economy Coalition composed of companies and NGO’s, and a plethora of conferences, academic papers 
and reports. 
International institutions have played a key role in advancing Green Economy thinking. In 2010 
the OECD launched its Interim Report of the Green Growth Strategy, and in 2011, the European Union 
published its Roadmap for moving to a Low-Carbon Economy in 2050. Of crucial importance, however, 
was UNEP’s 2011 Green Economy Report, a volume of more than 600 pages, which, according to its own 
words, aims at developing “pathways to sustainable development and poverty eradication”. Especially 
since the Rio+20 United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development, the notion of the ‘Green 
Economy’ has gained centre stage in international debates and policies on sustainability. 
Even though the project for a Green Economy is in a lingering crisis since the successive failures 
of the international climate summits, the fast rise and predominance of the discourse on the Green 
Economy is yet of huge significance. It transforms the terrain of the discussion on environmental 
questions, and opens the door for a relatively new set of actors to become the standard-bearers of the 
fight against the ecological crisis (such as corporations and banks), and for a new (market-based) 
paradigm of policy-making. Admittedly, this shift in green thinking has a long pre-history. The attempt to 
frame environmental questions in liberal, economic terms has been a constant since 30 years or so 
(Bernier 2012). As is well-known, a multiplicity of meanings has been attributed to the famous notion of 
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‘sustainable development’ which since the 1987 Brundtland report has structured the international 
environmental debates. The Green Economy appears to be the outgrowth of a specific interpretation of 
this notion: one which especially stresses the capacity of the market to deliver sustainability, and to 
reconcile economic, environmental and social goals.  
In this paper, we analyse the rise of the Green Economy discourse as a hegemonic shift with 
potentially broad ecological, social, ideological and (geo-)political implications. Methodologically, the 
paper draws on different sources. Inspired by critical environmental sociology and ecological marxism 
(including authors such as John Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett), it draws on Antonio Negri, Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Gramsci’s analyses of how capitalism reacts to oppositional movements and 
attempts to turn forms of struggle, in this case environmental struggles, into a motor for capital 
accumulation and economic development. These analyses are further enriched with the help of recent 
political-theoretical approaches to the problem of post-politics or depoliticization. The latter follows 
from the process of re-integration and recuperation of environmental conflicts within capitalism: this 
recuperation requires a translation of  environmental questions from conflict matters into objects of all-
round cooperation.  
The paper explores the limits of the Green Economy project particularly from the point of view 
of climate change, which is undoubtedly one of the major ecological crises we face today, although a 
focus on other ecological crises would probably lead to similar conclusions. The paper proceeds in three 
steps. First, we shortly describe the basic ingredients of the Green Economy project. Subsequently, we 
analyse the hegemonic implications of the rise of Green Economy discourse. We argue that greening the 
economy constitutes an example par excellence of passive revolution, whereby, moreover, an attempt is 
made to turn the pre-existing conflict matter into the source of renewed capital accumulation. The 
crucial question, of course, concerns the extent to which capitalism will succeed in turning conflict into 
consensus around a new, green mode of accumulation and to what extent this project for green 
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accumulation will be successful at all. As Marx (1973) has argued, capitalism has a strong capacity to 
turn obstacles into barriers and thus into new opportunities. However, some obstacles will be very 
difficult to surmount, as we will argue. Finally, looking for pathways beyond the Green Economy, the 
paper ends with a discussion of the conflicts that will inevitably unfold in the framework of the Green 
Economy experiment, and which can provide the basis for a repoliticization of the climate question. 
 
 
Green Economy: basic ingredients 
 
The Green Economy encompasses a whole spectrum of policy agenda’s, ranging from Thomas 
Friedman’s ‘Green Revolution’, via UNEP’s models and scenario’s, to the more progressive variant of the 
Green New Deal first developed by the British Green New Deal Group. On top of this, there is the 
discussion on ‘Green Growth’, advocated in particular by the World Bank and the OECD. Within the 
academic world, the Green Economy is becoming a topic of interest as such, but many other approaches 
have affinities with it as well, such as ecological modernization or transition management. The notion of 
the Green Economy increasingly functions as a catch-all for this patchwork of perspectives and 
approaches. 
There exists a range of variation and nuances, therefore. Many of these approaches slightly 
differ on a number of points: the extent to which they advocate government regulation and investment, 
the role they attribute to financial markets and techniques, the instruments used to create and correct 
markets, etcetera. At the same time, however, a number of red threads recur. We distinguish four 
ingredients which most variants of the Green Economy share. The first is to realize a transition towards 
sustainability via the market. This can be done by correcting existing markets, or by creating completely 
new, artificial markets. Examples of the first approach include subsidies and taxes which are supposed to 
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make sure that products are ‘correctly priced’. Forms of labelling or certification systems also function 
as soft forms to correct or steer the market. In this way, it is supposed consumers and companies will be 
induced to make environmental-friendly choices on the market. “Much of green growth is about good 
growth policies”, the World Bank argues, “addressing market failures and ‘getting the price right’ by 
introducing environmental taxation, pricing environmental externalities (such as carbon pricing), 
creating tradable property rights, and reducing inappropriate subsidies” (World Bank 2012, 12).  
Next to this, a range of experiments is undertaken with the creation of new, artificial markets. 
The most obvious example is the carbon market. The latter increasingly functions as a precedent for the 
implementation of similar markets in other fields. For example, UNEP (2011) advocates Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (PES), trade in pollution permits or in access rights to water, wetland banking 
schemes etcetera. Establishing such new markets evidently presupposes introducing private property 
principles and giving a price to nature. So-called ‘natural capital’ should thus receive an economic value. 
If the economy is supposed to become bio-based, the whole question arises as to who owns the 
biomass. Unsurprisingly, attempts to privately appropriate this biomass are the result (ETC-Group 2011). 
The second ingredient of the Green Economy follows from this focus on the market. When 
markets have become greened and competition is intense, new technologies will arise which will get us 
out of the current crisis. “Give me abundant, clean, reliable, and cheap electrons, and I will give you a 
world that can continue to grow without triggering unmanageable climate change”, Thomas Friedman 
(2008, 186-187) writes. We therefore need a market that can quickly sell promising ideas developed by 
companies or universities, he argues, as this will stimulate innovation. Technological and managerial 
innovation is an absolutely crucial ingredient for the Green Economy, as is stressed time and again in 
well-known reports of international institutions (World Bank 2012, UNEP 2011, OECD 2011). An example 
of the typical mix of beliefs in markets, economic growth and technological innovations is the 
Breakthrough Institute, whose leading figures advocate nuclear energy as a ‘safe’ and ‘cheap’ solution to 
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climate change (e.g. Shellenberger & Nordhaus 2013). Similarly, academic currents such as post-
environmentalism (Buck 2012) or ecological modernization (Mol and Spaargaren 2000, Spaargaren and 
Mol 1992) strongly focus on the interplay between markets and technology.  
A third recurring ingredient is sustainable entrepreneurship or corporate social responsibility, 
next to other voluntary engagements of the private sector. Market actors, once they become ‘conscious’ 
or ‘responsible’, have all the power needed to change productive practices, it is assumed. Numerous 
companies seem to have discovered green ideas over the last decade (but whether that leads to actual 
changes in practice is of course an entirely different matter (Dale 2008)): from BP changing its name into 
‘Beyond Petroleum’, to Coca-Cola offering ‘a bottle of hope’ during the Copenhagen climate summit in 
2009. Increasing cooperation between NGO’s and companies is also typical for this trend. WWF, for 
instance, has partnerships with companies such as Nokia, HP, Volvo, Ikea, Sony and Monsanto. The 
underlying idea is that as companies are becoming increasingly environmentally ‘conscious’, they can be 
changed from the inside, by helping them to put their practices, products and services on a better 
ecological footing.  
The fourth ingredient is closely related to this: through sustainable consumption, consumers can 
use their purchasing power as a leverage to green the economy. By choosing environmentally friendly 
products, consumers are supposed to be able to encourage companies to ‘green’ their practices. 
Sustainable consumption should therefore be actively promoted (e.g. UNEP 2011; Worldwatch Institute 
2010) and is sometimes even seen as the ‘holy grail’ of the transition towards sustainability (Jackson 
2005, 121; see also Kenis and Mathijs, 2012). Significantly, Al Gore, a staunch advocate of green 
economy thinking, closes his film An Inconvenient Truth with a list of sustainable choices individuals can 
make as consumers: buy energy efficient appliances, light bulbs, a new thermostat, a hybrid car, 
etcetera. Similarly, the official website of COP19 stated: “Every one of us may contribute to stopping or, 
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at least, limiting climate change”.1 The way this contribution is operationalized speaks for itself: “Reduce 
the use of electric energy (…) by choosing energy-saving equipment (marked with A, A+, A++ symbols) 
with thermostats and time switches. (…) Save water - by remembering to close the tap (also when 
brushing your teeth) or by installing a special spout” etcetera. As a conclusion, the website aptly states: 
“Become a conscious consumer”, this “will not only decrease the amount of waste, but also the amount 
of energy needed to produce what we consume.” 
Overseeing these different ingredients, a number of elements which are fundamentally at the 
basis of the ecological crisis, at least according to critical environmental sociologists (e.g. Burkett 1999; 
Foster, Clark and York 2010; Klitgaard 2013), are conspicuously absent. The fundamental social (class) 
relations of capitalism, based on the commodification of nature and labor, are strengthened rather than 
questioned in the Green Economy project. Rather than aiming to fundamentally altering the relations of 
production, limiting growth, rolling back global trade and fighting speculative mechanisms on financial 
markets, the Green Economy reinforces these elements, assuming it is possible to mobilise them in view 
of a sustainability transition. The Green Economy does entails a far-reaching attempt to recast the 
environmental debate in technocratic and market terms. In this sense, it realizes a profound ideological 
shift, including in how nature is represented. “Nature is the largest company on Earth”, the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature significantly states in a press report (IUCN 2009). This ideological 
shift is an important part of the broader hegemonic reconfiguration of the environmental terrain. 
 
 
Green Economy as a hegemonic project 
 
                                                          
1 http://www.cop19.gov.pl/about-climate-change 
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In his best-seller Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution—And How It Can Renew 
America, Thomas Friedman, the well-known New York Times columnist, pointedly summarized the 
philosophy of the Green Economy. “There is only one thing bigger than Mother Nature and that is 
Father Profit”, he states (Friedman 2008, 244). That is why we should mobilize Father Profit, he 
suggests, in order to save Mother Nature. Friedman is undoubtedly one of the most intelligent and 
influential advocates of the ‘Green Economy’, although he himself prefers to speak about the ‘Green 
Revolution’ or about ‘Code Green’. The idea is simple: if we want to make the transition to a green 
future, we should mobilize market mechanisms and the innovative nature of capitalism. 
But for Friedman, more is at stake than fighting environmental destruction. The Green Economy 
is not merely the solution for climate change and other environmental problems. It is also the exquisite 
chance for the US to again become hegemonic and regain its moral leadership in the world, which has 
been seriously undermined since the subprime crisis and the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Greening 
the economy, for Friedman, creates a possibility for the US to become less dependent on oil from 
autocratic countries which finance religious extremism, and on making war for safeguarding oil 
provision. “Making America the world's greenest country is not a selfless act of charity or naive moral 
indulgence. It is now a core national security and economic interest”, he argues (Friedman 2008, 23). 
“Everything America (or any country) can do to go green today will make it stronger, healthier, more 
secure, more innovative, more competitive, and more respected. What could be more patriotic, 
capitalistic, and geostrategic than that?” (Friedman 2008, 173). And what is almost as important: the 
Green Economy also opens a vast terrain for profit-making activity. Friedman quotes Lois Quam, 
managing director of alternative investments at Piper Jaffray, an investment company, saying: “The 
green economy is poised to be the mother of all markets, the economic investment opportunity of a 
lifetime, because it has become so fundamental. (…) The challenge of global warming presents us all 
with the greatest opportunity for return on investment and growth that any of us will ever see. To find 
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any equivalent economic transformation, you have to go back to the Industrial Revolution” (Friedman 
2008, 172). In other words: the Green Economy is not merely, or primarily about saving the planet, but 
also, or even primarily about saving capitalism. In any case, this is how the project is presented – 
whether it will fulfill its promises is an entirely different matter.  
In a critical analysis of what they call ‘green capitalism’, Mueller and Passadakis (2010) make a 
similar observation. Capitalism is confronted with a triple crisis, they argue. First, there is the 
legitimation crisis, most clearly manifested in the ongoing protests against international institutions such 
as the WTO, IMF, World Bank and others. Second, we face an accumulation crisis, a deep crisis that has 
profoundly shaken the global economy. Third, there is the biocrisis, including climate change, 
biodiversity loss, desertification, peak oil etcetera. In a more systematic way than Friedman, Mueller and 
Passadakis point to what is at stake in the project for a Green Economy. If it becomes possible to tackle 
the ecological crisis with market mechanisms, this might make it possible to not only do something 
about the environment, but especially to set global capitalism on a new footing. Paradoxically, climate 
change (and the other global environmental crises) appears to provide capitalism with a chance to 
overcome the impasse it is in. Indeed, greening the economy might become the royal road to saving 
capitalism, as it in actual facts entails the commodification and marketization of the green project. 
This is a recurrent argument in favor of the Green Economy. Protecting the environment would 
not merely be compatible with economic growth. Environmental policies are also supposed to trigger a 
new phase of growth (Jacobs 2013). As the World Bank president Jim Yong Kim states: “We have to find 
climate-friendly ways of encouraging economic growth. (…) The good news is we think they exist.” The 
British economist Nicholas Stern confirms: “It’s a very exciting growth story” (Stewart and Elliott 2013).  
The argument is clever: the Green Economy appears as the royal road to exit the current triple 
crisis, and especially the economic one. Fundamentally, the latter is a crisis of overaccumulation, a 
number of authors have argued (Callinicos 2010; Foster and Magdoff 2009; Joshua 2009). The best way 
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for overcoming such crises, is to create new markets. But the potential to do that is limited since 
neoliberal globalization capitalized developed countries, the former East Block has entirely been 
marketized, and many formerly public sectors have been privatized. The ecological crisis seems to 
provide an alternative way out: in the eyes of ‘intelligent investors’, it opens perspectives for the 
creation of new markets, some of which could become huge in size. Evidently, markets in green 
products, such as windmills, solar panels or organic food are booming. But even more promising 
prospects are lurking at the horizon: the creation of entirely new and artificial markets, of which 
emissions trading provides a prime example. In 2010, it was forecasted that a serious successor of the 
Kyoto Protocol, including the US, could spark a market of about 4500 billion dollar within ten year 
(Energy Business Reports 2012). Adding the market for derivatives, this figure might be even multiplied 
several times (Bond 2012). 
The stakes are high: if the market can become the instrument for tackling climate change (and 
other environmental crises), the struggle against climate change could become the royal road for solving 
the problems of the market – at least so it is thought. Evidently, certain sectors will see their market 
shares reduced, but elsewhere, huge opportunities can be created. “The investment opportunities 
presented by the transition to a Green Economy are unparalleled. The low carbon, resource efficient 
transformation of cities, industries, energy and transport systems, as well as the provision of finance and 
capital for those at the Base of the Pyramid, presents our capital markets and the global financial 
services sector with unprecedented challenges and opportunities”, David Runnalls writes (2011). 
 
 
Passive revolution 
 
 11 
 
A peculiar means-ends reversal seems to be at work in the Green Economy project: instead of being a 
goal in itself, climate stabilization becomes a starting point or a means for assuring renewed growth and 
economic and political hegemony. Evidently, this can only succeed if what was previously a conflict 
matter (“ecology against capitalism”, as in the title of one of John Bellamy Foster’s books (2002)) is re-
translated into a source for the modernization of capitalism. In other words, this means-ends reversal is 
made possible by a complex and strange process: what was previously a critique and a source of 
opposition against the economic system, is turned into a source of capitalist renewal. It is of course not 
the first time that such a dynamic can be observed. 
A number of sociologists, and especially autonomist marxists such as Mario Tronti (1977) and 
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2000), have shown that many developments which lead to a renewal 
of capitalism cannot be understood unless one pays attention to forms of resistance and opposition 
against capitalism. What is more, resistance and opposition are often the motor forces of important 
transformations within capitalism. Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) have shown for example how the 
critiques of the May ’68 movement have been intelligently integrated in the system through new human 
resources management discourses. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2003) have made a similar 
argument, although for them, this recuperation of resistance has a broader bearing: it can even become 
the motor force behind new forms of capital accumulation. They famously showed how Keynesianism 
involved a transformation of capitalism in which the opposition of labor to capital was internalized in a 
new dynamic of capital accumulation. The workers’ wage demands were turned into the motor force 
behind a new capitalist configuration relying on mass production for mass consumption. This laid the 
basis for what were probably the most dynamic decades western capitalism has ever known.  
The contemporary rise of the project of the Green Economy might be another example of such a 
dynamic. This project constitutes an attempt by international institutions, governments, companies, 
think tanks and banks to intelligently answer the ecological critique of market society. The content of 
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this critique is translated into a different language, and the energies mobilized by environmental 
movements are drawn towards the creation of new possibilities for capital accumulation. 
What is behind this dynamic is a singular logic of the invention of a new type of capitalism: what 
used to be a matter of deep conflict and antagonism is turned into a new regime of accumulation. A 
well-known quote by the British utopian socialist William Morris (1886), which Negri and Hardt (2000) 
used in the beginning of their book Empire, captures what is at stake rather well: “Men fight and lose 
the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and then it turns out 
not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name”. The 
students of May ’68, the workers of the 30s and later, and the environmental movement all probably 
had different goals in the beginning. In a sense, to follow William Morris, they were defeated, but their 
protest nevertheless sparked important changes, through which what they advocated came into being 
in a completely different form than originally intended.  
To a certain extent, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt draw on the work of Antonio Gramsci in 
his analysis of how capitalism reinvents itself and re-establishes its hegemony after a wave of struggles 
against it. Gramsci (1998) spoke about “passive revolution” or “revolution-restauration”, through which, 
as an answer to previous opposition and crisis, an attempt was made to reconstruct the hegemony of 
capital and the capitalist state, by making changes which could be quite fundamental even though they 
do not touch the core parameters of capitalism as such. It is very significant that advocates of green 
capitalism such as Thomas Friedman speak about a “green revolution” in this regard: they acknowledge 
the profundity of the changes needed, while they fundamentally remain within a market framework.  
Both Gramsci and Negri and Hardt have stressed that such changes within capitalism especially 
also affect the field of social and political forces that previously existed. In the words of Negri and Hardt, 
they generate a process of de- and recomposition of the social forces involved. Gramsci (1998, 58) 
especially also paid attention to how, through a passive revolution, the leadership of the opponent force 
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(the workers movement) could become integrated within the new power block that was created (he 
called this phenomenon “transformism”). Something similar is at stake in the current attempt to realize 
a Green Economy, whereby a number of NGO’s are joining forces with companies and banks 
participating in Green Economy projects. 
 
 
Hegemony and recomposition 
 
The speed with which the discourse of the Green Economy has gained centre stage is remarkable: until 
five years ago, this was still a marginal notion, and in so far as it was used by NGO’s or political forces, 
the term was often not well-defined. Now it increasingly functions as a nodal signifier around which a 
whole set of actors, demands and ideas cluster. In this sense, it is the hallmark of a genuine hegemonic 
project (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Indeed, the Green Economy discourse, in all its variants, seems to be 
succeeding in hegemonizing the environmental field, to the extent that it also becomes the focal point 
of many critical and oppositional forces. While critical environmental movements during the 
Copenhagen summit still primarily targeted what they called ‘false solutions’ for climate change (TNI 
2008), increasingly they are turning against the Green Economy itself (Mueller and Bullard 2011).  
This means the Green Economy discourse is generating a recomposition of the ecological field. 
This recomposition is actively pursued by Green Economy advocates, who try to gather as many forces 
as possible behind this market version of environmentalism. Time and again, it is stressed that the Green 
Economy will create jobs (E.g. UNEP 2008), and that it ought to engage the lowest social classes. In the 
words of Friedman (2008, 336): “Code Green has to prove that it can offer something to the very lowest 
rungs of the economic ladder, not just to upper-middle-class people. If all Americans can't see 
outgreening as a strategy that could improve their lives, it will never generate the momentum and scale 
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that it needs to succeed”. In many versions of the Green Economy, NGO’s, civil society organizations and 
even labor unions are invited to support the project, and become actively involved, in a sphere of 
cooperation. A broad but loose transnational alliance of actors is thus emerging, ranging from 
international institutions to global think tanks, international NGO’s to sectors of both green and liberal 
parties, from certain industries and even financial institutions to academics. 
Strikingly, this is not an alliance against fossil fuel capitalists, banks or speculators: on the 
contrary, it is a coalition that aims to include these as well, with the hope to change them ‘from the 
inside’. The 2013 Warsaw climate summit was a case in point. “By being creative, the world can reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions while creating jobs, promoting economic growth and ensuring better living 
standards. Where there is a will, there is a way!”, Marcin Korolec, the summit’s chair, stated 
optimistically.2 And he strongly defended the inclusion of companies such as ArcelorMittal, Emirates and 
BWM as partners of the summit, as if that would boost the success of the summit, or make these 
companies greener. 
Through such moves, an open hegemonic struggle against pre-existing, fossil fuel capitalism is 
usually avoided in favor of a broad-based and inclusive transition process in which key players of actually 
existing capitalism (energy companies, car manufacturers, banks and other financial actors) have 
supposedly a key role to play. In other words, a broad, inclusive and “expansive hegemony” is pursued 
by the Green Economy project (Mouffe 1979). 
Evidently, there are some approaches which do recognize the inevitability of agonism. The 
Green New Deal Report, which some call the “left wing of the project” for a Green Economy (Mueller 
and Bullard 2011, 2), for example pleads for “a new political alliance: an alliance between the labor 
movement and the green movement, between those engaged in manufacturing and the public sector, 
between civil society and academia, industry, agriculture and those working productively in the service 
                                                          
2 http://www.cop19.gov.pl/the-president-of-cop19-cmp9 
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industries” (Green New Deal Group 2008, 6). Interestingly, the report suggests this alliance is directed 
against at least one opponent: “the dominance of the finance sector in the economy”. Most often, 
however, this is not the case.  
In his book The Green Collar Economy: How One Solution Can Fix Our Two Biggest Problems, Van 
Jones (2008) advocates the building of an alliance composed of the organized labor movement, social 
justice activists, environmental groups, students and faith organizations. Bringing Jones’ ideas into a 
Gramscian framework, Boone Shear (2010, 204) call this a “new historical bloc”. Shear appears to be 
very optimistic about the possibility for the left to appropriate the Green Economy discourse. Perhaps 
his statement, that “political possibilities for the Green Economy (…) are not constrained and produced 
through an already hegemonized field” (Shear 2010, 205) has already become outdated, given the 
strong hegemonization of the Green Economy discourse by international institutions, market-oriented 
think tanks and lobby groups the last couple of years. Indeed, as the environmental field is recomposed, 
adversaries of the market ideology which is typical for the Green Economy, also have to reinvent and 
reorganize themselves. This has led to the growth of an increasingly visible movement for ‘climate 
justice’, a notion which serves as an alternative nodal point juxtaposed to the Green Economy (Bond 
2012; Mueller and Bullard 2011; see also Kenis and Mathijs 2014).  
The climate justice movement argues that the Green Economy project faces a number of 
obstacles which might make it impossible to reduce greenhouse gas emissions fast enough in order to 
stabilize the climate. Furthermore, they argue that greening the economy through market mechanism 
threatens to shift the cost of this transition towards lower social classes both in the Global North and in 
the Global South. 
 
Obstacles and barriers 
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The question which obstacles the Green Economy faces is not an easy one. In a certain way, capitalism 
thrives off the confrontation with obstacles. “(A)s representative of the general form of wealth – money 
–,” Marx (1973, 334) wrote in the Grundrisse, “capital is the endless and limitless drive to go beyond its 
limiting barrier. Every boundary is and has to be a barrier for it. Else it would cease to be capital – money 
as self-reproductive”. Capitalism, Marx suggests in this passage, has an enormous capacity to turn each 
boundary into a barrier that can be transcended. It is this dynamism which distinguishes it from previous 
forms of society. From the perspective of capital, obstacles are no hard limits, but open the door for 
more (Kovel 2007). Each obstacle is the starting point for the creation of new markets, new 
commodities, and new profit opportunities. As Paul Burkett (2006) has shown, even environmental 
degradation is seen as an opportunity for new forms of capital accumulation. If local resources are 
exhausted, one can import others via the world market. If there is a problem with excessive waste, the 
market will quasi-spontaneously produce a waste industry, which will burn, export, recycle or bury it. 
New illnesses as a result of environmental pollution provide the pharmaceutical sector with new 
opportunities. If people suffer from depressions and burn-outs, the wellness industry will turn a profit 
from it. If too much CO2 is emitted, a new market is created for trading emissions. Capitalism always 
appears to be able to find ways out of its crisis, on the condition that these can be sold.  
Something similar is at stake in the current project for the Green Economy. Rather than seeing 
the ecological crisis as a limit for capital accumulation, the crisis is turned into a new opportunity for 
further accumulation. At the same time, however, the capitalist solution for one crisis threatens to re-
create new social and ecological crises on ever higher and complex scales. As John Bellamy Foster, Brett 
Clark and Richard York (2010) show, Marx already observed that if the local soil is depleted as a result of 
the ruptured social-natural metabolism in nineteenth century British agriculture, the predominant 
answer was simply to import soil from elsewhere. The massive importation of guano and other nutrients 
from Latin American countries threatened at the same time to disrupt the metabolism on a global scale. 
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Or to take another example: when most forests were cut in England, industrialists took recourse to coal 
and later to other fossil fuels, such as gas and oil. This led eventually to climate change. Today, the 
market solution for climate change (e.g. emissions trading) threatens to reinforce other ecological crises, 
such as biodiversity loss, as plantations with fast-growing trees are set up in order to ‘offset’ carbon 
emissions, for example.  
When the ecological crisis is used for the creation of new market opportunities, the almost 
inevitable result is that the market logic is introduced on terrains which were previously untainted by it, 
and that even nature itself becomes increasingly capitalized (Smith 2006). It is no longer a mere 
resource or a place to dump waste, but the very product of capitalism: capital produces nature in order 
to capture CO2, for example. 
Consequently, the ecological boundaries which capitalism is increasingly confronted with, are 
not always as strict. Capitalism is capable of playing with these boundaries, shifting them or postponing 
their effects. It buries waste in the ground or attempts to store CO2 deep in the soil via the controversial 
technology of ‘carbon capture and storage’, which might not only delay rather than solve global 
warming, but also introduces new risks, e.g. due to leakage of CO2 from underground reservoirs 
(Marshall 2010). This does not mean that limits are inexistent. Researchers of the Stockholm Resilience 
Centre have for example analyzed nine “planetary boundaries within which we expect that humanity 
can operate safely”, each of which is threatened by major environmental crises (Rockström et al. 2009). 
Yet, from the viewpoint of capitalism, it is more ‘rational’ to develop new and often risky technologies 
(e.g. geo-engineering) to avoid the worst effects of climate change rather than to tackle the root causes 
(burning fossil fuels in an economy based on unlimited growth), or to set up a whole system to 
‘compensate’ for or ‘offset’ emissions rather than reducing them. The result is a worsening 
environmental crisis, but this does not immediately and necessarily endanger capitalism itself. The kind 
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of nature capitalism needs is of a poorer kind than that which is needed for qualitative human life 
(Burkett 2006). 
Yet, the central question is of course whether these attempts to ‘green’ capitalism will be 
sufficient to really ward off the damaging consequences of environmental crises, more in particular 
climate change. Furthermore, it is important to underscore that this transformation of boundaries into 
barriers, and the opening of new fields of capital accumulation are not automatisms. They require an 
active process of renewal and experimentation on the part of capital. This is by definition a process with 
unknown outcomes, and in which capital is not unified, but whereby different capitalist currents will 
come to stand against each other: think for example about the big oil companies and car manufacturers 
on the one hand, and recycling and renewable energy industries on the other. It is far from certain 
whether each and every boundary can, and will, indeed be turned into a mere barrier, and what the 
consequences of this will be.  
There is no doubt about it that capitalism has a certain capacity to develop ‘greener’ techniques, 
production processes and products. Early capitalists in the Netherlands made a profit from windmills, 
and they can perfectly do that again (Abramsky 2010). The real question is whether that is also possible 
on a macrolevel (Tanuro 2010). Is it possible for the global economy to be based on capital 
accumulation, and at the same time to maintain biodiversity, stop desertification and deforestation, and 
limit the emissions of CO2 and other harmful substances? This is a very complex question, for which it is 
difficult to provide exact answers. The least we can say is that it will not be easy for capitalism to turn 
the obstacles it is faced with into mere barriers.  
In what follows, we want to shortly discuss a number of difficulties which capitalism will be 
confronted with in its attempt to renew itself, and which might mean that it will nevertheless be 
confronted with real limits or boundaries. If that is the case, the attempt at passive revolution 
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conducted within the framework of the ‘Green Economy’ might be vain, and this might open a space for 
alternative forces, gathered under the banner of ‘climate justice’, to gain strength.  
 
Limits of Green Growth 
 
A first limit is that of growth, and the illusion of so-called ‘green growth’. “Growth is not negotiable”, 
Thomas Friedman (2008, 55) states. “To tell people they can't grow is to tell them they have to remain 
poor forever”. Therefore, Friedman advocates green growth, just as the World Bank or the OECD do. 
UNEP (2011, 504) claims that “a Green Economy grows faster than a brown economy over time, while 
maintaining and restoring natural capital”. But this thesis, and the whole notion of ‘green growth’ is 
increasingly questioned (Victor and Jackson 2012; Hoffmann 2011; Jackson 2009; Heinberg 2011).  
The big challenge for advocates of green growth is to make the rate of dematerialization and 
decarbonization high enough to make sure that continuing economic growth corresponds with less 
ecological impact. As Minqi Li (2008) has shown, however, if we want to realize the most ambitious 
scenario which the IPCC puts forward in its 2007 report, namely 445 ppm CO2eq [parts per million CO2 
equivalent] (which, in the meantime, has been questioned by a number of scientists as being not 
ambitious enough (Hansen et al. 2008)), extremely strong reductions of energy and carbon intensities 
will be required if we still want to retain some scope for economic growth. In the period 1973-2005, the 
emissions intensity of the global economy diminished with 0,3%, the energy intensity with 0,9% per 
year, while economic growth was 3% on average. Li develops a number of scenario’s with much stronger 
reductions in emissions and energy intensity in global production. His most ambitious scenario puts 
forward combined yearly reductions of the emissions intensity by 2,7% and of energy intensity of 2%. 
However, as he shows, even this scenario does not leave any scope for economic growth. According to 
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Li, the global economy will still have to shrink by about 0,7% to reach the 445 ppm objective, which is 
already not the most ambitious scenario imaginable. 
Obviously, there is also a tension between pursuing growth on the one hand, and striving for a 
more just distribution of economic welfare, for example between the Global North and the Global 
South, on the other hand, as Victor and Jackson (2012) have shown. The problem is that from a social 
justice perspective, the Global South should be allowed to realize a certain amount of further 
development and economic growth, in order to satisfy basic social needs. Therefore, the reduction of 
CO2 intensities should proceed much faster than when no account was taken of global inequalities. This 
is especially so because current CO2 intensities in many southern countries are higher than the global 
average. “(I)t is unlikely”, the authors conclude, “that reductions in CO2 emissions (…) and significant 
closure of the gap between rich and poor (…) are simultaneously possible without some curtailment of 
ambitions for economic growth” (Victor and Jackson 2012, 15). 
 
Getting prices right? 
 
A second problem is about how to make the transition from fossil fuel capitalism to a Green Economy. 
More precisely, the question is whether it is possible to effectively realize such a transition in a short 
enough lapse of time if the chosen pathway is through the market. One example of the type of problems 
encountered is the question how high the price should be that is put on CO2 in order to make sharp 
reductions possible. As Kevin Anderson (2012) argues, “(t)he price would almost certainly be beyond 
anything described as marginal (probably many €100s/ton) – hence the great ‘efficiency’ and ‘least-cost’ 
benefits claimed for markets would no longer apply”. The point is that the needed change is so great, 
that it cannot easily be grasped within the neoclassical paradigm of economics, which tends to focus on 
marginal change and incremental adjustments (Anderson 2012; Anderson and Bows 2013).  
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In his famous 2006 report on the cost of climate change, Nicholas Stern puts forward the climate 
objective of 500 to 550 ppm CO2eq, which is much higher than what is deemed necessary by recent 
climate reports (e.g., Hansen et al. 2008; IPCC 2007). A stronger reduction of the emissions is not 
possible since it would endanger the normal functioning of the market, Stern (2006, 247) suggests: 
“Digging down to emissions reductions of 60-80% or more relative to baseline will require progress in 
reducing emissions from industrial processes, aviation, and a number of areas where it is presently hard 
to envisage cost-effective approaches”. Furthermore, he states that “(p)aths requiring very rapid 
emissions cuts are unlikely to be economically viable” (Stern 2006, 203; see also Tanuro 2010).  
The conclusion is clear: it seems not to be evident to realize a market-steered transition to a 
decarbonized economy. Unless one attenuates the climate objectives, which is what Stern appears to do 
in his 2006 report, as Daniel Tanuro (2010) has shown. Stern (2006, 204) puts forward the objective of 
550 ppm as the only economically attainable goal, as “(e)xperience suggests it is difficult to secure 
emission cuts faster than about 1% per year except in instances of recession”. Yet, according to climate 
scientists, the objectives will have to be much sharper, and they will have to be realized much more 
quickly. Scenarios of at least 2% reduction of CO2 emissions per year might be needed to attain the IPCC 
objectives (Kasibhatla, Chameides, et al 2007). In later work, Stern (2009) recognized that sharper 
reductions will be necessary, and puts forward the global objective of 500 ppm CO2eq (450 ppm for 
CO2). However, as we have shown, climate scientists such as James Hansen (2008) argue in the 
meantime that even this objective is not ambitious enough, and they therefore advocate a limit of 350 
ppm for CO2.  
A similar problem is observable in UNEP’s Green Economy report. The latter develops two green 
investment scenario’s: the first, G1, implies a yearly investment in greening the economy of 1% of global 
GNP, the second, G2, opts for 2% per year of investments. Strikingly, even the more ambitious G2 
scenario succeeds only in reducing the CO2 emissions by 2050 with a third compared to 2011, which 
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equals a reduction of 4 to 7% compared to 1990 (UNEP 2011; IBON 2011, 7). It should be clear by now 
that this is far below the objectives put forward by climate science (e.g. Hansen et al. 2008). 
 
The social cost of the green economy project 
 
A third obstacle is that the transition towards a green capitalism will probably also put a lot of pressure 
on relations between social classes. Since thirty years, the share of wages in national income is 
decreasing in a large part of the world. Will a greener capitalism reverse this trend, or reinforce it? 
Which impact will the Green Economy have on the distribution of wealth between labor and capital? An 
often heard argument is that greening the economy will create new jobs. Underlying is the idea that a 
sustainable society will possibly more strongly rely on labor-intensive activities, instead of replacing 
human labor by fossil-fuel driven machines. The question is what effect this can or will have on the rate 
of exploitation of labor. Thanks to cheap fossil-fuel based energy, capitalists have been able to massively 
substitute machines for labor and in this way lower the production costs. The question is whether this 
tendency can so simply be reversed. There are good reasons to doubt whether a greener capitalism can 
create many jobs without at the same time putting huge pressure on wages, which means workers and 
poor people will carry a disproportionate burden. Under certain conditions, such as fordism, win-win 
situations between labor and capital seem to be possible: economic growth and increasing productivity 
can engender higher wages for workers along with high profits for capital. However, the downside of the 
fordist compromise is that it led to historically unprecedented levels of energy consumption, deepening 
the ecological crisis (Altvater 1993, 187). The historical exhaustion of this fordist model and tightening 
ecological limits make it increasingly difficult to realize such win-win situations. If economic growth can 
no longer be used to ‘buy’ social peace, struggles for redistribution will plausibly gain in importance. 
According to the French economist Michel Husson (2009), a greener capitalism is in principle not 
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impossible. But there are two conditions. First, a global institution is needed that can impose norms 
which radically go against the ‘spontaneous’ functioning of the market. And second, a carbon price has 
to be introduced, which is so high that it will affect profitability and in all probability lead to the rapid 
collapse of many companies and even entire sectors. A scenario for a green capitalism therefore 
threatens to have to go through a period of crisis and turbulence before it finds a new equilibrium. The 
price that has to be put on carbon might be so high that the proper functioning of the market can be 
severely disturbed. Yvo de Boer, the former secretary-general of the UNFCCC, argues that the price for 
carbon should be set at 150 euro per ton CO2 (EurActiv 2012). This is much more than the average 7 to 8 
euro which a ton of CO2 emissions cost within the European emissions trading system during the first 
Kyoto period. The risk is that such high carbon prices, while sensible from a climate science point of 
view, might be difficult for the market to absorb without heavy shocks. These shocks will not merely be 
economic, but especially also social shocks, with many people losing their jobs in a short lapse of time, 
and not being sure whether the new ‘green’ sectors will be able to offer them alternative employment. 
It is therefore very questionable whether it is desirable and feasible to organize the transition to a 
sustainable society via market mechanisms and incentives. 
A final big problem, related to the difficulty of transition, is the following. According to 
calculations by the Carbon Tracker Initiative in 2011, only 565 gigatons of CO2 could still be emitted 
before 2050 if we want to stabilize the climate (2°C global warming)3 (Campanale and Leggett 2012). At 
the same time, the proven reserves of fossil fuels were equivalent to 2,795 gigatons of CO2 at that 
moment, which is about five times as much. This means there is only a limited amount of fossil fuels that 
                                                          
3 Evidently, this critical treshold is the object of an ongoing debate, which is not only scientific but also political. 
The target of 2°C warming implies that many small islands might disappear, that glaciers will significantly melt in 
the Himalaya, that coastal regions, for example in Bangladesh, can be threatened, and that Africa will probably 
face increasingly strong droughts (Bond 2012). 
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can still be burnt to generate energy. In itself, this creates already the possibility for economic shocks: if 
the world would be serious about keeping fossil fuels in the ground, the market capitalization of major 
oil firms might collapse, sending shock-waves through the economic and financial system. This once 
again reveals the double bind we are confronted with when we stay within a market logic: either climate 
shocks or economic and social shocks.  
 
 
A tale of two myths 
 
Capitalism can deal creatively with these obstacles, but turning them into mere barriers will require a lot 
of ‘inventiveness’, to say the least. This will probably include a number of struggles to control natural 
resources, and to shift the burden of adjustment onto lower classes and the Global South. In order to 
break open the Green Economy discourse, and create a space for alternative discourses, it is important 
to pinpoint to these problems of the Green Economy both from an ecological and a social justice 
perspective, and repoliticize the debate on climate change.  
As has been suggested previously, the Green Economy project is one possible further 
development of the idea of sustainable development. One of the latter’s basic slogans (‘People Planet 
Profit’) is making its reappearance. UNEP, for example, explicitly dismisses the idea that there are trade-
offs between profit and planet. “Perhaps the most prevalent myth is that there is an inescapable trade-
off between environmental sustainability and economic progress”, it is argued in its Green Economy 
report (UNEP 2011, 16). “There is now substantial evidence that the greening of economies neither 
inhibits wealth creation nor employment opportunities. To the contrary, many green sectors provide 
significant opportunities for investment, growth and jobs.” Similarly, in the Rio+20 document on the 
Green Economy, it is stated: “We emphasize that it [the Green Economy] should contribute to 
 25 
 
eradicating poverty as well as sustained economic growth, enhancing social inclusion, improving human 
welfare and creating opportunities for employment and decent work for all, while maintaining the 
healthy functioning of the Earth’s ecosystems” (UN 2012). However, there are also slightly different 
voices: the World Bank recognizes that “(w)e cannot presume that green growth is inherently inclusive. 
Green growth policies must be carefully designed to maximize benefits for, and minimize costs to, the 
poor and most vulnerable, and policies and actions with irreversible negative impacts must be avoided” 
(World Bank 2012, xi). Researchers sympathizing with the Green Economy project have also pointed to 
potential trade-offs (Barbier 2012), but stress that if well-designed, the Green Economy project can 
avoid or overcome them. 
The recurring suggestion is therefore that tensions between people, planet and profit might 
occur, but are not inescapable or inevitable: with good policies and governance, a reconciliation 
between these goals should be possible. There are two problems with this idea. First, it tends to 
underestimate the extent to which hard trade-offs do exist. The most significant trade-off is the tension, 
or even contradiction, between limitless expansion and the finitude of the planet, which we pointed to 
in the previous section. Another trade-off is closely related to the issue of class. As we showed, there is a 
big chance that a greener capitalism can only be created by at the same time putting further pressure on 
wages and shifting the burden to workers and poor people.  
Second, UNEP and the other international organizations favoring the Green Economy downplay 
the extent to which economic development, and especially social progress and sustainability are 
contested notions. What constitutes a reconciliation between these principles for one actor might not 
necessarily be perceived in the same way by another actor. By way of an example, we can point to a 
well-known carbon offsetting project in Durban, South Africa (Bond and Sharife 2012). In the early 
2000s, the World Bank set up a project in a landfill at Bisasar Road, which focused on the conversion of 
methane emissions from the landfill into electricity. At first sight, this appeared as a win-win-win 
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situation: a significant contribution to the struggle against climate change was made by avoiding the 
release of methane into the atmosphere, some employment could be created for local inhabitants, and 
significant profits could be made from the sale of both electricity and certified emissions reduction 
credits. However, this example of a win-win-win situation turned out to include many ‘losers’. 
Therefore, the landfill  became a prime topic of discussion in the climate justice movement during the 
Durban UN Climate summit of 2011.  
The landfill, the largest in Africa, had been set up during the Apartheid era, in a neighborhood 
where many blacks live. Many people became ill and doctors called the site a “cancer hotspot” (Bond 
and Sharife 2012). A popular movement demanding the closure of the site arose, and gained quite some 
momentum. The ANC government had pledged to close the dump, until the World Bank arrived with its 
CDM project. The latter gave a new lifeline to the landfill, which will probably be staying for years to 
come. The obvious result is that a dumpsite, a symbol of pollution and environmental destruction, can 
survive as it is given a green tinge. Obviously, the way the popular resistance movement estimated what 
constitutes social, ecological and economic advantage or progress turns out to be entirely different from 
how the World Bank and the UNFCCC regarded it, and is thus inevitably a political question. 
Therefore, the question which should be asked is whether the real myth is, pace UNEP, not 
rather the idea that profit-making, environmental protection and social progress are uncontested 
notions and can be reconciled without any problem? Indeed, as all myths, the storyline of the Green 
Economy has its effects: it not only tends to obscure real trade-offs, but it especially functions in such a 
way as to pull all the noses in the same direction, rendering certain conflicts of opinion and of interest 
invisible. In this sense, it inevitably functions in a depoliticizing way. 
 
Post-politics 
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In general, many Green Economy discourses focus on all-round collaboration, and tend to disregard the 
conflicts which might spring forth from the difficult choices and trade-offs that will probably be 
inevitable in any process of ‘greening’ the economy. The realignment of a whole range of social forces in 
a broad cooperation is underpinned by two discourses which are increasingly converging. On the one 
hand, there is the ‘People Planet Profit’ discourse mentioned above, which is older than the recent 
Green Economy project, but seems to revive in a new guise in the current context, suggesting that a 
number of values or objectives are reconcilable, and that conflicts and trade-offs can thus be avoided. 
On the other hand, the idea has gained force that we ought not to be divided when confronted with 
such a huge challenge as climate change. “Global warming is too serious for the world any longer to 
ignore its danger or split into opposing factions on it”, Tony Blair, who during the Rio+20 conference 
made a speech for a “Clean Revolution” as an “expressway to the Green Economy”, famously stated 
(2005). As Swyngedouw (2007, 2010) aptly summarizes: the predominant discourse is one of a common, 
external enemy (CO2) which demands all-round collaboration to tackle it here and now. Given the 
urgency and scale of the challenge there would not be time anymore for partial conflicts and discussions 
which divide the forces which should be united in this one overarching struggle and aim (Kenis and 
Lievens, 2014). 
A double move seems to be at work. On the one hand, this argument for all-round collaboration 
between institutions, companies and NGO’s, characteristic of Green Economy discourses, is 
symptomatic for the broader attempt to integrate environmental antagonism into capitalism as it tries 
to turn a matter of conflict into a motor force for economic development. On the other hand, this 
reconfiguration of the previous antagonism within a regime for economic development cannot succeed 
without the explicit denial of conflict, in other words, without forms of active depoliticization.  
Depoliticization is the representation of social relations as if these are not characterized by 
political realities such as power, conflict and decision, but as if they are rational, logical, evident, 
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grounded in nature or based on cooperation (Mouffe 2006; Lievens 2013). The recent trend towards the 
depoliticization of environmental discourses has been amply studied in other literatures (Swyngedouw 
2007, 2010, 2013; Žižek 2007; Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw 2010; Kenis and Lievens 2014; Kenis and 
Mathijs 2014). In the framework of this paper, however, it is important to situate this resurgence of 
post-political environmental discourses within the ongoing movement of passive revolution, which 
entails a recomposition of social and political forces. This is a process in which a number of NGO’s play 
an active role: they consciously inscribe themselves in the Green Economy project, as they perceive the 
latter as an opportunity to ‘mainstream’ their concerns. The central idea is that as a number of 
corporations, enterpreneurs and banks have finally discovered the ecological theme, the environmental 
movement no longer has to fight them, but can cooperate with them and ‘help them’ realize change 
from within. We already pointed to the example of WWF, an organization with a long track record of 
collaborations with multinational corporations. However, most of these companies are not immediately 
known for their good environmental practices, but are happy to present themselves as ‘green’. BP is a 
typical case in point. Renaming itself ‘British Petroleum’ in 2001 and spending 600 million dollar to 
promote itself as a green company (as much as it invested in renewable energy at the time) (Worth 
2010), the company remains very much focused on fossil fuels, and is involved in several projects for the 
exploitation of Canadian tar sands. Both with regard to sustainable enterpreneurship, and as for the 
partnerships NGO’s constitute with them, there is a deep gap between theory and practice (Dale 2008), 
as many corporate practices rather constitute forms of greenwashing (Rogers 2010). By doing so, they 
tend to make certain conflict lines and oppositions invisible. In this sense, depoliticization is rooted in a 
more profound reconfiguration of the environmental field.  
If, on the other hand, trade-offs will inevitably arise, this depoliticization risks to mask conflicts 
that are real and deserve to be brought to the fore. If we want to make alternative social-ecological 
futures (such as imagined in the concept of ‘climate justice’) possible, fighting against the myth of the 
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Green Economy project will inevitably require we fight post-politics as well. The crucial question, 
therefore, is how the obstacles that the Green Economy project will inevitably encounter can become 
the starting points for processes of repoliticization which enable alternative future possibilities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have argued that the discursive shift that has recently taken place towards the notion 
of the ‘Green Economy’ implies a significant re-translation of the green project. The Green Economy is 
nothing less than a wide-scale attempt to turn ecological obstacles to capital accumulation into mere 
barriers that can open the door for new economic opportunities. In this sense, tackling the ecological 
crisis becomes the royal road for solving other problems contemporary capitalism is facing, such as the 
economic crisis and the crisis of legitimacy. Even though the project for a ‘Green Economy’ is still in its 
infancy and faces massive hurdles, it already triggers an important recomposition of the field of 
environmental politics and environmental resistance, for example, seducing numerous environmental 
NGO’s to join its cause.  
 However, the breakthrough of Green Economy discourse has also led to new alternative voices. 
The nascent ‘climate justice’ movement is an important reaction to this recomposition of the 
environmental field. It advocates a process of profound social change beyond capitalism, supported by 
wide alliances of forces, including workers, peasants, women, indigenous peoples and their myriad 
organisations, trade unions and political forces (Bullard and Müller 2011; Bond 2012; see also Kenis and 
Mathijs 2014). It centrally aims at a socially just transition to a sustainable future, based on principles of 
decommodification, deprivatisation, social equality, commoning and radical democracy, and thus 
represents an emerging opposition to the recipes of the so-called Green Economy.  
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